The global financial crisis has highlighted instances of conflicts of interest and corporate abuse by company controllers. This has been the case in Malaysia and elsewhere, where weaknesses in the legal framework have enabled corporate misconduct to occur. This paper critically examines the legal framework protecting minority shareholders of Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs) against controlling shareholders (also referred to as substantial shareholders) and directors being engaged in related party transactions (RPTs) and other conflict of interest situations. It considers gaps in the law which have enabled related parties to engage in improper transactions with their companies and outlines recent developments aimed at strengthening the rules protecting shareholders against improper RTPs. The paper considers the significance and likely effectiveness of recent reforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will critically examine the legal framework protecting minority shareholders of Malaysian PLCs from the actions of controlling shareholders (also referred to as substantial shareholders) and directors who are engaged in RPTs and other conflict of interest situations. We will show in this paper that while there have been some worthwhile reforms concerning RPTs in Malaysia in recent times the problem seems to be with implementation and enforcement. This could be due to a number of factors. It could be a funding and resource issue or cultural factors could come into play. Also relevant is the fact there is no tradition in Malaysia of standing reform committees which put into effect ongoing plans and structures and review the outcomes of previous initiatives to ensure proper compliance and enforcement.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I provides the introduction and background. Part II examines the legal framework regulating against conflict of interest by related parties in Malaysian PLCs, outlining the various legal principles and rules which have been developed and/or introduced in Malaysia, including those under the: i. common law; ii.
Companies accounting standards.
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The discussion of the shareholder protection rules will include reference to specific requirements for disclosure of conflicts or potential conflicts, the appointment of independent directors, the requirement of shareholder approval and other rules and standards to regulate against conflict of interest by related parties in Malaysian PLCs.
Part III provides the conclusion which considers the significance and effectiveness of the various reforms 39 42 The Financial Reporting Standards are drawn up by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB).
A. Background
The East Asian economic and financial crisis of 1997/1998 and now 10 years later, the global financial crisis, have both generated a significant amount of analysis and debate, particularly about macroeconomic issues such as exchange rate volatility and good corporate governance, in the region and globally respectively. In addition, the financial crises have also provoked increased awareness about issues concerning the role and function of regulators and the need for improved disclosure and good corporate governance. The crises brought to light various instances of corporate abuse and in some cases breakdown, attributable in part to ineffective corporate governance structures. 46 Minority shareholders in Malaysian PLCs encounter problems such as RPTs which are caused mainly by ownership concentration and exacerbated by the problematic legal remedies available 47 and ineffectual enforcement. 48 This establishes the need for greater protection of minority shareholders in Malaysian listed companies. 43 Bushon, R.B., ‗More Scrutiny on RPTs in Times of Crises', (2009), The Starbizweek, Saturday 21 February. 44 Ibid. 45 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7818220.stm. 46 These examples are further discussed below. 47 The common law and statutory remedies available for minority shareholders are affected by numerous problems such as proving fraud on the minority under common law or ‗oppressive' or unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory' acts under s 181 of the Act. 48 The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 2010survey showed that Malaysia's enforcement of laws is generally poor. They gave Malaysia a score of 38%for enforcement.This was far below Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand. http://www.acgaasia.org/public/files/CG_Watch_2010_Extract_Final.pdf (viewed on 23rd June, 2011.)
Controlling shareholders holding the position, for example, of CEO are usually in a position to enter into contracts that maximise shareholder wealth. These contracts can cover a broad range of transactions including raising capital, selling firm outputs, hiring employees and leasing assets, amongst others. Sometimes these contracts are entered into with someone who has a close and possibly privileged relationship with the company, including controlling owners or directors of the company, their immediate families and other companies that they control. Such contracts are commonly referred to as RPTs.
Given that related parties can use their influence to procure such contracts and influence the terms of the contracts in their favour, RPTs are usually viewed as being inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximisation. 49 Malaysia's Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLRC) was of the view that whilst control by an owner can be beneficial to monitor the company's performance, instances involving expropriation of the company's assets by controlling shareholders or insiders have an impact on corporate governance and minority shareholders' protection. Directors and controlling shareholders are positioned such that they can have enormous influence to enter into transactions that expropriate wealth from outside shareholders. Expropriation is said to occur when the company receives less net benefit from a RPT than could have been obtained from a transaction with an unrelated counterpart. 50 The CLRC 51 recognised that PLCs in Malaysia are controlled by substantial shareholders and that where there are concentrated family shareholdings, there is a higher probability of substantial or controlling shareholders of a company or insiders, like directors, unfairly dealing with the company's assets at the expense of the minority shareholders.
The potential effects of RPTs have been examined in various academic studies. Scholars, On the other hand, RTPs can have some positive effects and the CLRC expressed the view that these transactions may be beneficial to a company where they fulfil certain economic functions. They may be contract efficient for various reasons. For example, the parties are familiar with one another, complete information will be provided and contracts can be entered into without any time delay. In economic terms there will be reduced information asymmetry, thereby reducing transaction costs. Therefore, governments will not prohibit them absolutely as their potential value is too great. Instead, the approach is generally to subject RPTs to legal controls to minimise their negative impact. The CLRC stated that there is a need to have provisions within the Companies Act to regulate substantial property transactions with related parties. According to the CLRC, incorporating provisions into the Act will also provide criminal liability for non-compliance and this punitive element will be a deterrent factor. 56 The CLRC recommended that provisions should also apply to substantial shareholders. [t]he core of the difficulty is that, because the agent commonly has better information than does the principal about the relevant facts, the principal cannot costlessly assure himself that the agent's performance is precisely what was promised. … the value of the agent's performance to the principal will be reduced either directly [by shirking on the part of the agent] or because, to assure the quality of the agent's performance, the principal must engage in costly monitoring of the agent.
It has been said in defence of concentrated shareholding companies, that the large shareholders, referred to as block shareholders, can benefit the minority shareholders through indirect use of their power and self-interest to prevent expropriation by management. 70 However, there are also situations in which these controlling shareholders might be in pursuit of objectives inconsistent with those of the minority shareholders. 71 The controlling shareholders, acting 72 . In 1998, the purchase by United Engineers (M) Bhd (UEM) of shares in its associate company Renong Bhd (Renong) was an example of how weakness in public governance affects corporate governance. Both companies were public listed companies. UEM bought a substantial stake in its associate company, Renong whose executive chairman Halim Saad was closely associated with the top leaders of UMNO (the Malay component of the coalition ruling party). The price which UEM paid for Renong's shares (which was double the prevailing market price) amounts to 86%. of the UEM's shareholders funds at that time and raised UEM's debts from RM300 million to RM2.7 billion
The Securities Commission nevertheless allowed this transaction to go through and granted UEM a waiver from having to make a mandatory general offer for the remaining shares of Renong in accordance with the law. 73 UEM's share price fell 48% in the week following the announcement of the purchase. 74 This is an example of a related party transaction in a state controlled company which was viewed as a -bailout‖ of politically connected businessmen and allowed to proceed by both the regulatory bodies, Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission.
Other On a smaller scale, Bushon gave the example of the RPT in the case of ‗The Store Corporation Berhad' which purchased a mall for RM130 million from parties related to the managing director, Datuk Seri Tang Yeam Soon. 79 A more recent ‗mega' deal which she said piqued minority shareholders was the MMC Bhd's proposed acquisition of Senai Airport Terminal Services Sdn Bhd for RM1.7 billion. Both companies are linked to MMC Bhd's major shareholder, Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar Albukhary. 80 Other examples of recurrent RPTs in Malaysian companies include Genting Malaysia and Tai Kwong Yokohama Berhad. Among the issues raised in the Genting Malaysia (Resorts World) RPT with its parent Genting Berhad were the appointment of a single ‗independent' property valuer for both of the transactions and the status of the independent directors when they sat on both boards (Genting Malaysia and Genting Berhad). Although the independent adviser for this transaction concluded that the transaction was immaterial and would not affect the future cash flow of the firms, alternatively it could be seen as a cash extraction by the parent company, Genting Berhad. 81 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The various common law rules, statutory provisions and self-governing codes which regulate against conflict of interest by related parties in Malaysian PLCs are intended to prevent persons with an actual or potential conflict of interest from dealing with the company's assets at other than arms' length consideration. Originally in Malaysia the rules targeted directors and certain ‗connected persons', but recent reforms have extended their coverage to substantial shareholders and to a wider category of ‗connected persons' than was previously the case. The rules are intended to enhance the transparency required for RTPs and to minimise the potential for a conflicts of interest by related parties. However it is interesting to note that while Malaysia's new legal rules effectively tighten up the RPT legal framework the problematic issue is enforcement. This seems to be confirmed by recent CG ranking reports. The CLSA CG Watch 2010 shows a small improvement for Malaysia, however it is clear that there is still a weak CG culture and more significantly, Malaysia's improved scores on this ranking exercise appear to be due to enhanced rules and regulatory framework, while enforcement remains problematical.
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A. Disclosure Rules
Mandatory disclosure to alert shareholders on RPTs is one of the most important controls affecting PLCs. In Malaysia, fiduciary disclosure obligations forRM24.6m (including RM8.6m debt owed to Genting Berhad ) . 86 In addition, disclosure rules are also found in securities laws, the LRs and the accounting standards. All PLCs must comply with all these requirements, which increase the costs of management of the company. As will be seen the interplay of these rules is quite complex. The rules overlap, considerably, with the statutory obligations and the LRs intended to overcome limitations or gaps in the common law.
At common law directors owe certain fiduciary obligations to the company. The fiduciary basis of these duties in many cases necessitates a complementary duty to disclose matters which could compromise directors' ability to act bona fide in the interests of the company.
Also, at common law, directors are strictly precluded from placing themselves in a position where their duty to the company conflicts with their personal interests. An example of a conflict of interest is where there is a disposal of the company's assets to or the acquisition of assets by a company from its directors or persons connected to such directors. 87 The application of this no-conflict principle simply means that a director cannot be interested in transactions involving the company or derive any benefit from his or her office. The only exception, in the absence of authorisation in the company's memorandum or articles, is when he/she makes full disclosure of the nature of the interest to the company and has the contract ratified by the general meeting. 88 If otherwise, the transaction is voidable at the company's option and the company may recover from the interested director all the benefits which might have been have derived. 89 Many companies' articles provide authorisation by the board and thus overcome the need for disclosure to the company as a whole.
The application of the no-conflict rule does not depend upon the extent of the adverse interest of the fiduciary, or whether the transaction entered into is fair or unfair, or whether the company itself could not avail itself of the opportunity or that the directors acted honestly.
The common law fiduciary rules are strict, but have a number of limitations. For example, they do not apply to controlling or substantial 86 A listed company's articles also impact on its disclosure obligations. 87 shareholders. 90 In addition, under the common law there is no prohibition on the company entering into the transaction in the first place. There is also generally no prohibition on a director who is a shareholder from voting on the transaction in which the director has an interest and this may enable the director or related persons to use their voting power to expropriate the company's assets at the expense of the minority shareholders. 91 Further, in a concentrated shareholding company (common in Malaysia), if the director owns substantial shares, this defeats the purpose underlying shareholder protection as his/her vote can also be taken into account since he/she will have a right to vote to ratify the transaction. This may be overcome by the provision of a voting exclusion rule in the articles of association that prevents directors and related parties from voting to approve their own selfinterested transactions.
The common law position regarding disclosure by directors who contract with their companies or who place themselves in a conflict of interest situation is supplemented by the Act. 92 The Act recognizes that directors may be interested in contracts but imposes a statutory duty on the part of interested directors to disclose their interests. 93 The effect of this is to take away and limit the freedom of companies in drafting articles which abrogate the common law principle that there must be disclosure of interests in contracts.
Every direct (or indirect interest) on the part of directors, other than those excluded by the Act, 94 needs to be disclosed. For example, where the interest of the director consists only of being a member or creditor of a corporation, the interest can be disregarded unless the interest is regarded as being a material interest. 95 No guidelines are given as to the circumstances under which the interest of a director as shareholder or creditor of a corporation may be regarded as being material. The requirement that the interest must be ‗material' endorses the test 90 Section 69D of the Act and section 7 of the Securities Industries (Reporting of Substantial Shareholding) Regulations 1998 define a ‗substantial shareholder' as a person who has an interest in one or more voting shares in the company and the nominal amount of that share or the aggregate of the nominal amounts of those shares is not less than two% the aggregate amount of all voting shares in the company. (The Companies (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1998 reduced it from 5% to 2%). 91 This has been altered by the LRs, discussed later in the article. 92 Section 131(1) Act. applied under the common law 96 that for the noconflict rule to apply, a reasonable person must consider that the interest held by the director was one which would give rise to a real sensible possibility of conflict between duty and interest. A further exception releases a director from the necessity to make a formal declaration of the interest at a board meeting where the nature and extent of interests is well-known to all the other directors.
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Where a director is interested in a contract (or proposed contract), the interest 98 has to be declared as soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to his/her knowledge. The Act explicitly requires interested directors to declare their interests to the board. 99 In addition, a director who holds any office or possesses any property which might create a conflict between his/her duties and interests must declare at a meeting of the board of directors the fact and the nature, character and extent of the conflict. 100 This takes the disclosure requirements to a much wider category of situations than merely disclosure of interests in contracts.
The Act provides that an interested director has to declare the ‗nature' of his/her interest. It also requires judgment on whether an interest is material or not. The disclosure has to be not only of the nature but also the extent of the interest. It is clear that a disclosure is not sufficient unless there is full and detailed disclosure of the interest. 101 Disclosure is enhanced by the requirement under the Act, 102 that the company must also keep a register disclosing the particulars of its directors' interests and the nature and extent of the interest in shares in the company or in a related corporation, in debentures or participatory interests of the company or related corporations and the nature and extent of the interest, rights or options held individually by the director or with other persons.
However these disclosure provisions in the Act are not as strict as the common law as they only require directors to disclose to the board of directors. In such circumstances, the shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, will not be aware of the transaction nor can they do anything about it. Moreover, until recently there was no provision in the Act which restricted directors of PLCs from being present at the meeting where a contract where he/she has a direct or indirect Act 2007 , now provides that a director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract shall not participate in any discussion while the contract is being considered at the board meeting and shall not vote on the contract.
The position of substantial shareholders has been contentious, as they also have the ability to influence the uptake of related party transactions. There are also provisions in the Act which require disclosure of directors' substantial shareholdings in a PLC. These provisions are pertinent as they facilitate the enforcement of the disclosure provisions on substantial shareholders. Substantial shareholders, 104 as well as being required to notify the company of their interest in the company, 105 must also notify the company of a change in their interest.
106 A change in interest or interests is deemed to have occurred when substantial shareholders acquire or dispose of their voting shares. They must also notify the company within seven days that they have ceased to be substantial shareholders.
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The common law, as we noted above, only requires directors and not substantial shareholders to make disclosure of RPTs. Besides the statutory requirements of disclosure, the LRs now require all RPTs to be disclosed, including those involving substantial shareholders. 110 the LRs in relation to RPTs, tightening the disclosure requirements for transactions involving related parties. The LRs have also expanded the role of the ‗independent adviser'. Under the LRs an independent adviser is appointed to advise the shareholders before the terms of the transactions involving related parties are agreed upon. Since the 2005 amendments an independent adviser is now required to advise minority shareholders in relation to voting on the RPT in question. The independent adviser must advise the minority shareholders whether the transaction involving related parties is fair and reasonable so far as the minority shareholders are concerned and whether the transaction is to the detriment of minority shareholders. The independent advisor must also advise minority shareholders on whether they should vote in favour of the transaction.
The changes have also widened the range of RPTs. The definition of RPT under the LRs 111 covers the acquisition and disposal of assets, the provision and receipt of services and the provision of financial assistance. It also now extends to the establishment of joint ventures and any business transaction or arrangement entered into by a listed issuer or its subsidiaries.
Under the LRs, if the RPT is one where the percentage ratio 112 of the assets which are the subject of the transaction is equal to or exceeds five%, the company must ensure that a circular is sent to the shareholders giving them details of the transaction. The shareholders' approval of the transaction is then sought in a general meeting following the report of the independent adviser who is to act as appointed to advise the shareholders. 113 As noted above, by virtue of the recent enactment of s 131A of the Act, only disinterested parties may vote at the meeting to 110 Paragraphs. 10.08,10.09 and 2.06, 2.08 and 2.19 of the LRs 111 The LRs, Paragraph 10.2. 112 Percentage ratios mean the figures, expressed as a percentage, resulting from various calculationsincluding, the value of the assets which are the subject matter of the transaction, compared with the net assets of the listed issuer -Chapter 10 of the LRs. 113 As discussed above. approve the transaction. The requirement for shareholder approval means that the LRs now align with the strict common law rules for disclosure of material interests to the general meeting.
With regard to RPTs involving recurrent transactions of a revenue or trading nature which are necessary for the company's day-to-day operations such as supply of materials, the company does not have to seek shareholders' approval in respect of transactions that are in the ordinary course of business and are on terms not more favourable to the related party than those generally available to the public.
As well as changes to the LRs, disclosure rules have also been enhanced under the Accounting Standards. Since the late 1970s Malaysia has been adopting the accounting standards consistent with those issued by the International Accounting Standards (IAS) Committee. The International Accounting Standard 24 114 on related party disclosures has been adopted as an accounting standard in Malaysia as Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 124.
The objective of this standard is to ensure that a company's financial statements contains the necessary disclosures that highlight the existence of related parties, transactions and outstanding balances with such parties which affect the financial position and profit and loss of the company. Under FRS 124, which came into effect in 2006, the following disclosures have to be made: the relationships between parent company or the ultimate controlling party and subsidiaries irrespective of whether there have been transactions between those related parties, key management personnel compensation including termination benefits and share-based payments and also if there have been transactions made between related parties. The company shall disclose the nature of the related party relationships as well as information about the transactions and outstanding balances which are necessary for an understanding of the effect of the relationship on the financial statements.
In theory, the various disclosure requirements we have discussed above are intended to achieve the objective of ensuring that the shareholders and other users of the financial statements have timely access to material and relevant information. However, the effectiveness of the requirement of disclosure of RPTs has a number of problems in Malaysia. Firstly, minority shareholders in a concentrated shareholding PLC, even with the material information, may decide not to vote against the majority shareholders who normally are the founder families of the company, as in the case of the late Lim Goh Tong and family of Genting 115 found various other problems with the disclosure of RPTs. The members said that detecting a RPT is problematic. The members highlighted that the complex ownership structure of PLCs in Asia, including Malaysia, creates particular challenges for detecting RPTs. They said that groups of companies with major shareholders who have access to insider information often expropriate minority shareholders. According to them, some of the most difficult transactions to identify include those that occur between a listed company and another company in a group that can lead to transfer pricing and expropriation. Therefore if the company decides not to disclose a RPT, it may go undetected.
In countries, like Malaysia, with fairly large state-owned companies, determining the nature of RPTs is particularly difficult and costly. Even in the case of large RPTs, it may be difficult to identify whether the transactions are abusive, especially if there is no market price. Abusive RPTs according the Roundtable members are a global challenge, as the lack of transparency when insiders deliberately fail to disclose such deals to shareholders is widespread.
Another problem identified by the 2007 Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance is the capacity of regulators to sanction non-compliance with disclosure and/or approval rules. Leading international corporate law scholars have identified this as the most serious problem of all in controlling agency costs associated with RPTs. 116 Where information, such as that concerning RPTs, is outside of the categories of information typically required for periodic disclosure then ‗vigorous enforcement alone seems to be able to ensure compliance'. We discuss enforcement issues in Part F of this paper below.
It is evident, that disclosure is an important aspect in the regulation of RTPs, but clearly not in itself a sufficient tool. 115 
B. Independent Directors
The function of the board of directors is two-fold. The board must lead the company by determining future strategy, while monitoring and controlling its current performance. 117 It has been said that nonexecutive/independent 118 directors should contribute to both the functions.
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Their ‗independence' means that they have an important role to play in monitoring RTPs. When considering a RPT, the responsibility of the independent director is to comment whether the transaction is fair and reasonable so far as the shareholders are concerned and whether the transaction is to the detriment of minority shareholders. The opinion must set out the reasons for, the key assumptions made and the factors taken into consideration in forming that opinion and to advise minority shareholders on whether they should vote in favour of the transaction.
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In Malaysia, requirements for appointing independent directors to monitor transactions between companies and their directors and/or controlling shareholders are found in the LRs. Paragraph 15.02 of the LRs require at least two directors or one-third of the board (whichever is higher) to be independent. 121 The definition of an independent director under the LRs is a person independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of the company. 122 An independent director does not get involved in the day-to-day running of the company. Further, there is no contract of service between the director and company. The concern for minority shareholders is whether the independent director will give an honest opinion to the minority shareholders bearing in mind that the majority are the ones who appointed him/her.
The responsibilities effectively. The new Code states that independent directors should continue to make up at least one-third of the members of the Board and that there should be a more meaningful and independent oversight function. However, it is worth noting that in the Asian context, the OECD has cautioned against complacency on the issue of director ‗independence'. The Paper stated that:
While the theory on independent non-executive approval may hold some appeal, real-life experience in Asia reveals shortcomings not unlike those in other regions. High ownership concentration among Asian listed companies means that controlling shareholders usually select the entire board of directors. In these and similar cases, non-executive directors can fail to demonstrate in practice the independent judgment required to make their consent an effective safeguard against abuse. In other cases, non-executive directors assume their duties with an independent mindset but cease to maintain it over time as their sympathies, or their interests become too closely aligned with insiders. Finally, passive or acknowledgeable directors can fail to scrutinise transactions closely enough to apply informed, independent judgment, even if their level of activity may be sufficient to shield them from liability from negligence.
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It is also worth noting that there are some contradictions in the conventional approach to board effectiveness and compassion, including the emphasis on ‗independent' directors. It may well be that the emphasis on independent directors has been overplayed. As Carter and Lorsch 126 point out: Assumptions about board effectiveness have considerable impact on composition of boards and how directors approach their duties…But assumptions are flawed and unintended consequences can cause problems for boards that diminish their effectiveness. In fact, independent directors with no relationship to the company are not likely to know very much about its business and will have to learn, and will be dependent on management for this.
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This underscores the fact that independence of judgment, as emphasized by the OECD, will be more important as a safeguard against improper actions by directors and related parties, than strict or technical definitions of independence.
Another has a -significant shareholder‖, in addition to the requirement that one-third of the board should comprise independent non-executive directors, the board should include a number of directors which fairly reflects the investment in the company by shareholders other than the significant shareholder. For this purpose, a -significant shareholder‖ is defined as a shareholder with the ability to exercise a majority of votes for the election of directors. Further, the Code states that in circumstances where a shareholder holds less than the majority but is still the largest shareholder, the board will have to exercise judgement in determining the appropriate number of directors which will fairly reflect the interest of the remaining shareholders.
The exclusion of substantial shareholders from independent participation on boards can have the effect of disenfranchising a significant group of persons with a strong incentive (as a result of their large shareholding) to ensure that their rights are not aggrieved by the conduct of the controlling shareholders. At times, the collective action problems preclude effective monitoring by small shareholders. However, large shareholders, in defending their own self-interests will often defend the interests of the small shareholders as well. Therefore, to exclude these persons or their nominees from the definition of ‗independent' and thereby from the various board committees that mandate the presence of an independent majority may seriously erode the ability of large outside shareholders to make it harder for the insiders of a company to ignore or deceive a minority shareholder.
C. Shareholder Approval
The right to vote is one of a member's fundamental rights. 128 It is recognised in Malaysia as a proprietary right and every member has an unfettered right to exercise his/her votes as attached to the shares. 129 We have already referred briefly, above, to the need for shareholder approval of RTPs under the common law, and more recently the LRs. At common law, a director must not place himself/herself in a situation where personal interest may actually or possibly conflict with his/her duty to act in the interest of the company. The common law states that directors may be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duty unless shareholders' approval or ratification at the general 128 It is uncommon in Malaysian PLCs to have nonvoting shareholdings. 129 Section 148 of the Act provides that every member shall have the right to vote on any resolution notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the company's memorandum and articles of association . meeting has been obtained in respect of transactions that involve a conflict of interest.
130
Although the common law provides that a director has a duty to avoid conflict of interest situations, which include self-dealing transactions, the common law fiduciary duty may be inadequate because such a duty would not be applicable where the director did not have a direct pecuniary interest in the transaction, or did not intend to cause any detriment to the company. In addition, under the common law there is no prohibition on the company entering into the transaction. More significantly, there is also generally no prohibition on a director who is a shareholder also voting on the transaction in which he or she has an interest 131 and this may enable the director or related persons to use their voting power to expropriate the company's assets at the expense of the minority shareholders, although in some cases the vote of the majority shareholders at a general meeting may constitute a fraud on the minority.
132
Whilst a director may be held liable to account for the profits he or she accumulated as a result of the breach of duty under the common law, there is however no criminal liability.
There are provisions in the Act governing specific conflict of interest situations which require shareholder approval for the disposal or acquisition of a company's main undertaking or assets;
133 for the issue of shares by directors, 134 and for the acquisition and disposal of substantial non-cash assets. The specific provisions on substantial asset transfers, contained in s 132E, apply to both directors and persons connected with directors. These transactions require disclosure to and approval of shareholders. Since the introduction of the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007, substantial shareholders are also caught under this provision.
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Section 132E now provides that no director, substantial shareholder or connected person can acquire shares or non-cash assets of requisite value from the company or dispose of such shares or noncash assets of unless they have had prior approval of the transaction by a resolution of the company at a general meeting. Without such approval the transaction is voidable at the instance of the company unless the arrangement and transaction 130 135 Another disclosure requirement of companies in Malaysia is the composition of the firm's equity ownership.
are ratified within a reasonable period by the company in general meeting. The term ‗any arrangement or transaction' includes a number of transactions which have a common purpose.
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Section 132E covering substantial asset transfers is in some respects quite narrow. For example, it only applies to non-cash transfers. It is also subject to a minimum threshold requirement and a number of broad exceptions.
137 A decade ago the Finance Committee 138 expressed concern about this provision in the Act which allows for ratification of a substantial property transaction, observing that in practice shareholders may be unwilling to vote against a transaction that has already been entered into,. The Finance Committee recommended that the provision should be removed and the Act should be reformulated to adopt a simplified method of defining a substantial property transaction. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not adopted by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007. However, some safeguards have now been introduced to mitigate the influence of the controlling or substantial shareholders.
There is no doubt that these are needed. 140 The amendment to s 122A (2) of the Act is based on the view that familial connections and relationships often give rise to the ability to influence. The CLRC also stated that in cases where the director or substantial shareholder may not be aware that the transaction is entered into with persons connected to them, the proposal that parties who are 'innocent' of the contravention should not be made liable provides adequate protection for the director or substantial shareholder. The recent amendment to the Companies Act 141 reflects this recommendation placing liability only on directors who ‗knowingly authorize the company to carry into effect such transactions'.
In addition to the substantial asset provisions, discussed above, the Act also contains several other specific related party prohibitions which reinforce general provisions against conflicts of interests 142 and act in addition to the common law fiduciary principles set out in established cases. 143 For example, under s 130 loans to directors or persons connected to directors are prohibited except in the case of exempt private companies. 144 Unlike the substantial asset provisions, shareholder cannot vote to approve loans to directors. However, as presently formulated, the Act narrowly only prohibits loans and guarantees. Other financial benefits to directors and related parties such as gifts, quasi loans and generous extension of credit facilities are not covered. There are also a number of exceptions to the loan prohibition, which are subject to the approval of the shareholders in general meeting.
The Finance Committee 145 recommended amendments to close off the apparent loopholes allowing other types of financial benefits which have the potential to adversely affect the company to be provided to directors and others.
D. Listing Requirement amendment affecting RTPs
A wide range of transactions are now regulated by the LRs. They include such transactions as the acquisition, disposal or leasing of assets, the establishment of joint ventures, the provision of financial assistance, the provision or receipt of 140 See n 14, above. 141 Section 132E (6) Companies (Amendment) Act 2007. 142 The provisions in the Act governing specific conflict of interest situations are ss 133 and 133A prohibiting loans and guarantees provided to directors and connected persons and s 132G prohibiting the acquisition of shares or assets in a company in which a director, substantial shareholder or related party has a direct or indirect interest. 143 services or any business transaction or arrangement entered into. This is in contrast to the specific provisions in the Act, which are confined only to the acquisition and disposal of assets.
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Recent amendments to the LRs, 147 as we have indicated, strengthened the provisions on RPTs, which are now generally tighter than the rules under the Act, given that the RPTs now require the approval of the shareholders after the independent advisor has explained to them the nature of the RPT. Additionally, there is a wider range of transactions which are prohibited under the LRs than under the Act. The prohibitions under the LRs include providing an indemnity 148 and forgiving a debt, not enforcing or assuming financial obligations of another.
149 There are also standard strategies like the imposition of certain duties on directors of a listed company for example a duty of disclosure and the expansion of the role of the independent adviser to include advising minority shareholders in relation to voting on the related party transaction in question. 150 For recurrent RPTs, the LRs have introduced a threshold for the requirement to disclose in the annual report, the aggregate value of recurrent transactions made during the financial year for which a mandate has been obtained, amongst others for the protection of minority shareholders in the event of RPTs when the controlling shareholders divert value unfairly from the company and the minority shareholders to themselves.
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In addition, under the LRs, a listed company may only:
i. lend or advance any money; or ii.
guarantee, indemnify or provide collateral for a debt, 152 to or in favour of directors or employees of the listed issuer or its subsidiaries or persons to whom the provision of financial assistance is necessary to facilitate the ordinary course of business of the listed issuer or its subsidiaries or associated companies.
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The transaction may only proceed if it ‗fair and reasonable to the listed issuer and not to the detriment of the listed issuer and its shareholders'. 
E. Directors' Duties Provisions
Besides steps taken by the Code, LRs and legislation to require disclosure and prohibition of RPTs, there are also statutory duties imposed on directors under s 132 of the Act. The Companies (Amendment) 2007 inserted a number of provisions into the Act clarifying and extending the duties directors owe to their companies. Some of these changes build on reform recommendations of the Finance Committee and the CLRC. The amendments relating to directors' duties to act honestly and avoid conflict of interest reinforce the specific rules in regulating RTPs.
The Act expressly states that the statutory duties operate in addition to any general law duties. 154 The Act formerly imposed a broad duty on directors at all times to act honestly and exercise reasonable diligence in the exercise of their powers and the discharge of the duties of their office. 155 However, the meaning of ‗honesty' under the Act was not entirely clear. It was question of fact, based on the circumstances of the particular case, as to what ‗honestly and reasonably' means. The test for dishonesty seemingly placed an emphasis on subjective, rather than objective factors. The Finance Committee and the CLRC therefore both recommended that the statutory duty to act honestly be reformulated to require directors to exercise their powers for a proper purpose and in good faith in the best interests of the company. 156 The replacement of the duty to act ‗honestly' with the requirement that directors act ‗bona fide in the best interests of the company' was recommended to avoid the confusion concerning the meaning of ‗honesty' in the context of directors' duties. This reformulation places a higher objective standard on directors involved in related party transactions and brings greater certainty to the law, as there is a body of case law in other jurisdictions which on which has clarified the meaning of the good faith test.
Directors are also under a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. This means that they must not allow a situation to develop where their duties to the person for whose benefit they act and their personal interests are in, or may be in conflict. This is a crucial aspect of the fiduciary duties owed by directors to their company. The fiduciary duty to avoid conflict of interests has been applied in various circumstances. The common feature in all cases in which a breach of the duty has been established is that the directors placed themselves in a position where they put or may have put their own interests ahead of the interests of the company, 154 Section 132(5) Act. 155 as in the case of a related party transaction. 157 Again, both the Finance Committee and CLRC recommended that the common law fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest should be codified. This required that a clear set of rules be inserted into the Act. While the fiduciary rules have evolved in some detail in case law over many years, the reform bodies argued that it was inappropriate for the matter to be left purely to case law. Case law principles have frequently developed in the context of the legal frameworks of different jurisdictions and the rules obviously operate by reference to the particular facts of the case in question. The course of law reform in Malaysia required a more settled set of rules than that provided by case law.
Amendments to s 132 inserted by the
Companies (Amendment) 2007
158 impose the duty that directors or officers of a company shall not use the property of the company, any information acquired by virtue of their position as a director or officer of the company, their position as a director or officer, any opportunity belonging to the company; or engage in business is in competition with the company, to gain directly or indirectly, a benefit for him/herself or any other person, or cause detriment to the company. There will be no breach if the consent or ratification of a general meeting was obtained.
The codification of these specific common law rules sends a strong signal to directors of all companies, not just those in the listed sector, that conflicts of interest causing detriment to the company and its stakeholders will not be tolerated. They rules are now backed up the remedies and sanctions in the amended Act, including s 132E and s 368A.
F. Enforcement
Introducing legal rules and principles to regulate RTPs is not enough. regulations, regulatory enforcement in Malaysia has generally been considered poor. This is illustrated by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia last survey. 161 The Securities Commission has investigated a significant number of cases ranging from submission of false and misleading information, the use of schemes to defraud as well as the engagement in acts to defraud and short-selling 162 however, the prosecution of blatant breaches of law by politically well connected persons in PLCs has been extremely slow.
163 Table 1 The table below shows the percentage scores that each market gained in the five categories in the survey: -CG Rules and Practices‖, -Enforcement‖, -Political and Regulatory Environment‖, -IGAAP‖ (ie, accounting and auditing) and -CG culture‖.
To add to the problem of enforcement (and maybe it is another cause and effect of poor enforcement) is the existence of corruption. The Transparency International 2009 report 173 and the World Business Environment Survey 174 show remarkably high figures in comparison, for example, to Singapore. In Malaysia, 20% of public officials take bribes frequently whereas an additional 25% take them sporadically, compared to Singapore where, according to the reports, there is almost no corruption. 175 The establishment of the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission which commenced operations on 1 January 2009 is a necessary and important initiative, given evidence of entrenched corruption in Malaysian society.
III. CONCLUSION
There is cautious optimism that genuine changes are occurring in Malaysia, albeit slowly, in terms of higher standards of corporate governance for listed companies and a greater willingness to accept accountability and to protect minority shareholders against conflict of interest by related parties in Malaysian PLCs. While there is little debate that the various compliance requirements put in place to protect minority shareholders impose a heavier load
